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Seller Inventory 0. Published by Primus, Darmstadt From: Der Buchfreund Wien, Austria. About this Item: Primus, Darmstadt, Dust Jacket Condition: VG. Index, bibliography, notes. Book has book club stamp to lower page edges no other bookclub indications either explicitly or in quality of construction , prev.
Jacket has tape-repaired tear upper rear edge near spine, light soil rear panel. Colors, titles and figures all bright and fine. Bogdanov, Dolgaia doroga v Troiu. Karl Eimermacher ed. Dahlmann, Knoop, pp. Symbiose und Konikte Munich: Oldenbourg, , p. Baedeker, Russland, 4th edn Essen, , pp.
Deutsches Leben in Moskau im Jahrhundert, in Nordost-Archiv N. Dnninghaus, Deutsche in der Moskauer Gesellschaft, chap. Dahlmann, Lebenswelt und Lebensweise, pp. On the Old Believers in the Russian economy, in particular in Moscow cf. Alfred J. Owen, Capitalism and Politics in Russia.
West and Jurii A. Petrov eds , Merchant Moscow.
About this book
Jahrhundert, in Jahrbcher fr Geschichte Osteuropas N. In exile after , one younger Moscow merchant wrote a collective portrait of this world of the Moscow entrepreneurs: Pavel A. Jurij A. Dahlmann, Lebenswelt und Lebensweise, p. Andreas Ruperti, Erlebtes in Russland unpublished , pp. Joseph E. Clowes, Samuel D. Kassow and James L. West eds , Between Tsar and People. Marc, Lebenserinnerungen, pp. The rst edition of the memoirs of one of the leading gures among the German industrialists in Russia in the interwar-period, mainly active in Rumania, was published in Spiesssche Familienzeitung, Beilageband II Marburg, Petrov, Deutsche Unternehmer in Moskau, in Dahlmann et al.
Waltraud Bayer, Die Moskauer Medici. Rechtliche Lage und soziale Struktur Cologne: Bhlau, p. Gesellschaft der Krhnholm-Manufaktur fr Baumwollfabrikate Narva, , p. Rieber, Merchants and Entrepreneurs in Imperial Russia, p. Ausgewhlte Aufstze, ed. Wolde, Knoop, p. Dahlmann, Ludwig Knoop, p.
Thompstone, Organisation, pp. Dokladnaia zapiska russkikh fabrikantov Ego Vysokoprevoskhoditelstvu Gospodinu Ministru nansov Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii Arkhiv, St Petersburg, fond , opis 16, delo , p. Amburger, Deutsche in Staat, pp. Schulze-Gvernitz, Volkswirtschaftliche Studien, p. Predprinimatelstvo i predprinimateli Moscow, , pp. Dittmar Dahlmann, Bildung, Wissenschaft und Revolution. Aleksandr A. Morozov, M. Put k zrelosti Moscow and Leningrad: Izd. Robert C. Williams, Culture in Exile. Dahlmann, Bildung, p. Dittmar Dahlmann, Die Provinz whlt. Kalantarov and Svatikov nished their studies in Heidelberg with a Ph.
Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Dittmar Dahlmann eds , Max Weber. Zur Russischen Revolution von Kistiakovskii in Heidelberg Webers article Zur Lage der brgerlichen Demokratie in Russ- land was published in a Russian translation Istoricheskii ocherk osvoboditelnogo dvizheniia v Rossii i polozhenie burzhuaznoi demokratii in Kiev by the publishing company I. Kistiakovskii was born in Kiev and had lived there as a political activist for the liberal movement together with his wife in and before he came to Heidelberg and became acquainted with Max Weber, MWG 10, p.
MWG 10, p. Gustav Radbruch, Briefe, ed. Dahlmann, Bildung, pp. Bezrodnyi, Zur Geschichte des russischen Neukantianismus. Edith Hanke, Prophet des Unmodernen. Leo N. On the evening of 21 June John Colville, private sec- retary to Winston Churchill, noted that Churchill again and again repeated what a pleasure it was to see Germany and Russia nally ghting one another; and that this was perhaps the happiest evening of his life.
That pleasure was of course perfectly understandable because at that time Britain stood with her back against the wall. So it was not just an acute danger but a longstanding nightmare from which he was released. What were the main motives which resulted in Barbarossa? Thus Russophobia, anti- Bolshevism and anti-Semitism are widely regarded as a natural or logical triad.
In this respect liberal- or left-minded German historians gen- erally share the same perspective, as for example Ernst Nolte, who constructed his notorious causal nexus between the rise of Nazism to power in Germany and the acute moods of anti- Bolshevism, Russophobia and anti-Semitism after In my view, having dealt for many years with German reactions to the revolution in Russia after , these are retrospective interpretations to which I would strongly object.
The special subject of this chapter conservative Russophilism and Sovietophilia is right at the centre of this discussion. To come back to my initial anecdote about Churchill, I am fully aware that the British view, in which Russia and Prussia have always been under suspicion of a potentially fatal collusion, runs much in the direction of my argument.
But as I would also like to demonstrate, this view is a little too harsh and too brittle. There was an old afnity between Russia and Prussia, although in terms of personal and cultural relations on the level of the two ruling bureaucracies it was easy to nd rather strained relations.
Even Bismarck is said to have had a very sceptical view of Russia after the social reforms of Alexander II in the s. He sometimes spoke about his nightmares of a red bureaucracy in power in St Petersburg. But this did not essentially change his view of Russia as a power that could never be domesticated or defeated by Germany. It was therefore his raison dtat to never allow the newly formed German Empire to engage in any serious conict with Russia. The downside of such dominating Prussian policies of Rckver- sicherung from Russia was a violent Russophobia among the liberal and democratic forces, for whom the Russian Tsar was still the head of the Holy Alliance, and stood behind all reactionary powers and repressions in Europe, thus creating violent hatred which was later transferred to the emerging Social Democratic Party.
As is well known, some of the ercest Russophobes in Germany and later in London were Karl Marx and his inhibited General, Frederick Engels, who longed for war with Russia as the signal for a European revolution. But that is another story. Around the turn of the century there was the rst major change of the signposts, which of course was related to the change of German imperial policies after Bismarck under Wilhelm II, towards inter- national politics Weltpolitik. For one thing there was a growing mood of dissonance among the Prussian gentry against Russia, not only because of the economic quarrels about the export of grain and other agrarian goods, but also through general disappointment and mistrust towards their fast-developing and industrializing eastern neighbour.
This mistrust and bad feeling were now systematically nurtured by a whole class of Baltic migr intellectuals and ideologues, who for more than a decade were the leading commentators within the conservative press. Under the guidance of the rst ordinary pro- fessor for Russian history at Berlin University, Theodor Schieman believed that these tendencies of Russophobia had been system- atically worked out. The central argument of Schiemann was that Russia, because of its inner heterogeneity, would always be an expansionist colossus, whose position would become more and more hostile to Germany as her only serious rival on the Continent, and also because of her massive inferiority complex.
Schiemanns strongest arguments were long quotations he took from the Russian press, in which the nal battle between Germans Teutons and Slavs was again and again evoked. But Schiemann who in fact was never able to form a school found after a potent rival in his former scholar Otto Hoetzsch, who as a historian argued on a much more sound and scientic basis, and revived the old admiration and aspiration of German conservatives for a state-induced and state-controlled way of industrialization, which he saw in full development in Russia.
It was specically the reforms of Stolypin after the Russian defeat against Japan, and the Revolution of , which Hoetzsch saw as a demonstration that Russia was neither invincible as a potential foe nor incapable of a dynamic development on her own. For him it was clear that Germany and Russia were natural allies in a world of rising imperialist tensions. In fact it was much more Otto Hoetzsch who became the real founder of German Eastern European Studies, rather than Theodor Schiemann, so much so that in autumn , months after the outbreak of the First World War, Schiemann was replaced by his rival Otto Hoetzsch as the chief commentator of Russian affairs in the semi-ofcial conservative newspaper Kreuz-Zeitung.
The point of conict was very clear: Schiemann as a fervent Russophobe had to argue in favour of peace, and even of a future alliance with Great Britain. This became more and more the mainstream opinion in the face of the protracting world war. But we have advanced a little bit too quickly in following the major tendencies of these times.
When I write of the change of signposts around , this did not only refer to the conservatives, but also and perhaps more importantly to the national-liberal middle spec- trum of the bourgeois parties and to the leading representatives of German industry. Take for example, Walther Rathenau the young heir of the mighty electro-technical company AEG, who later became an eminent writer, the organizer of German wartime industry, and for a short yet decisive period in the early s the foreign minister of the Weimar Republic, who signed the treaty of Rapallo in but was murdered soon afterwards.
Rathenau wrote in an early article in on the Trans-Atlantic Warning Signals of a new entente on the seas between Great Britain and the emerging United States of America: what is left open at the table of this partie carre are the corners, which could only be occupied by the Germans and the Slavs, who had already inherited the one- time position of the Romans, i. More astonishing than this rather sober strategic thought was the tone, in which Rathenau spoke of Russia as a young giant, whose feet covers half of Europe and half of Asia and whose breast and head are shielded by the invincible palladium of his orthodox faith.
The great spectacle of current and future times, Rathenau continued, would still be the battle between Russia and Britain about world hegemony. He said, For us Germans, all signs point to the East and to its ascendancy. This view was of course not representative in all respects; but it marked a characteristic change of traditional views within the German bourgeoisie and middle class.
That change was not only induced by political considerations, but also by the astonishing rise of Russia in the same period as a cultural nation Kulturnation. Besides the emergence of the world-famous, often avant-gardistic Russian painters, musicians, dancers and actors, there was also Russian literature, which appeared, as Thomas Mann put it later, as a miracle of world culture, and which early in his short novel Tonio Krger in , he labelled the holy Russian literature. Thomas Mann and Others This special note of devotion leads us into the heart of our subject.
The interest for Russian literature in Germany at this time was not so much based on the mere artistic substance, but on the philosophical and religious content of the social prophecies, which were supposedly to be found here. Behind the Homeric gure of the legendary preacher Tolstoi appeared the more modern, gloomy and ambiguous gure of Dostoevskii who found his posthumous position at the side of Nietzsche.
Meanwhile a third gure appeared, the juvenile proletarian autodidact Maksim Gorkii, whose stories of barefooted heroes and naturalist-existentialist pieces like Night Asylum caused a furore in German theatres. This was an international phenomenon, but one which made an especially deep impression on Germany in the pre-war, war and post-war periods. To be more precise, it became an inherent part of German ideology itself during these years.
You can hardly nd one important author or artist in Germany for whom in the words of Alfred Dblin the meeting with Dostoevskii was not an epoch-making event. More so, Russia became for many of them an artistic dreamland, where a nave, believing, natural and gifted people, cruelly treated and suppressed by their rulers, vacillating between upheaval and faithfulness, formed together with its great artists and poets the essential and true Russia, which had her future still ahead of her. If this was a form of romanticism, and it was, then it was already quite a modern one.
The people in this picture no longer bore the shape of the old muzhik, but of the barefoot proletarian and especially after the events of of the worker and the soldier. Even the Social Democrats in Germany, who had been rather mistrustful of the terrorist and anarchist movements in Russia in the s and s, were now compelled to acknowledge that the social uprising of , in the words of Kautsky, had up to then been the most explicit proletarian character of all revolutions.
It was Walther Rathenau, who in his pre-war writings in the spirit of cultural pessimism as in The Mechanization of the Mind, developed the metaphor of a migration of nations from underneath, which was in his view also a migration from east to west, a silent Slavization of Prussia and Germany. So you nd at this time, the years before the War, a complete picture of the great split between the old bourgeois West on one hand and the young proletarian East on the other hand, the latter becoming dominant after the War.
Even though in August the First World War began with a declaration of war against Russia, it had very little to do with any specic Russophobia in Germany, and not even with direct conicts between the two countries, but was thanks to the constellation of powers in general.
The rst round of war propaganda against the barbaric or despotic tsarist regime, the Russian abomination Russengreuel in Eastern Prussia etc. But the real hate propaganda was reserved for the treacherous Brits, when they entered the War. This war brought an incredible and spontaneous outburst of verse and prose, endless literature, in which nearly every eminent mind in the country took part.
To speak about propaganda is an understatement. It was an authentic intellectual production, in which Germany as a nation reinvented herself in a substantialist way as the country of the midst das Land der Mitte the midst of Europe, the midst of the world, the midst of mankind. But if you look closer into these so-called Ideas of , they were nearly exclusively developed in contrast to the Ideas of or to British utilitarianism.
The War developed mentally and intellectually into a conict between Germany and the West. Every constituent notion of Western social and political thinking was surpassed or overreached by a complementary German notion. Civilization stood against culture, the individual against the personality, the bourgeois against the Brger, formal citizen rights against moral law, and so on. And very early on it was commonplace, even among people of conservative or liberal orientation, to speak about German socialism as the antithesis to Western capitalism, not only as an exceptional measure in war- time, but as a factual and higher mode of production and social life in the future.
In this German war ideology, as we might call it, the ofcial tsarist Russia was not a worthwhile antagonist, because it represented no universal ideal. On the other hand there was an internal opponent of this regime, namely the suppressed Russian people, who from the mouth of its great poets and prophets represented a Russian ideal of all-human importance. This distinction between the people and the rulers could not be plausibly made in the face of the Western democracies.
In the East, by contrast, everything seemed possible. Germany could assign herself a liberating mission, with her ideology of the individuality of the people which had to be defended against the counterbalancing forces of the tsarist autocracy or of Western democracy. Moreover pieces of Russian thinking became an integral part of the newly formed German ideology or German ideal, because they especially the writings of Dostoevskii seemed to formulate the sharpest antithesis to Western ideas.
The classical text in this regard was certainly Thomas Manns Reections of an Apolitical, which centred on the problem of the German loneliness, and the world-offensiveness of Germany Weltanstigkeit Deutschlands. The answer may be found in Dostoevskiis description of Germany as the protesting Reich in its universal antagonism against Rome, which was a metaphor for the Western world. Thomas Mann worked for three full years on his text, nally nishing in December , just weeks after the Bolshevist takeover. He referred emphatically to German-Russian congeniality, whose real importance would be shown only after the War: What an afnity these two national souls share in their relation to Europe, to the West, to Civilization, to politics, to democracy!
And he continued: No! Whenever soul and mind should form the basis and the legitimation of power politics and alliances, then Russia and Germany belong together: their understanding. The text, nished on the day of the armistice between the German and Bolshevik governments in Brest in December , closed with the exclamation: Peace with Russia!
Peace rst with her! And the war, if it is to continue, should go on alone against the West, against the trois pays libres, against civilization, against literature, politics and the rethoric bourgeois! We have no method to objectively evaluate the reprentativeness of certain opinions a representativeness, which Thomas Mann has always claimed for himself because of his sensitivity for the Zeitgeist, as he would put it.
But one thing we can say for sure, referring to the passages I have cited, it would have been absolutely inadmissible to speak in such terms about any other enemy country. Is not the Russian the most humane among human beings? Is his literature not the most humane of all holy of humaneness. Like Thomas Manns attitude to the Russians after , his brother Heinrich couldnt and wouldnt ever speak about the French. Heinrich Manns famous essay about Zola was a metaphorical invocation of the value of an open and critical mind, not a proclamation of spiritual afnity of two peoples.
Thomas Manns anger at the writings of his brother Heinrich was not directed so much against the verbal text, but against the sub-text, which appeared to him an act of literary subversion, opening the doors to a spiritual invasion from the West. The work of Thomas Mann was in any case quite characteristic of the German reaction to the revolution in Russia in The February Revolution, with the establishment of the provisional government, had been quickly labelled as a British revolution on Russian soil, whereas the radical opposition movements around the Soviets and Lenins party were generally regarded with satis- faction, as an expression of the real will of the Russian people for peace and land.
The Bolshevik seizure of power in November seemed moreover to be a victory of German weapons and peace propaganda. And even the Bolshevik program of war communism was taken by most German observers as an outbreak of a natural or nave Russian egalitarianism and communitarianism. Even if it was bound to fail, it could be regarded as a desperate attempt to gain a hold on the disrupted economy, or even as a touching experiment which later on could be pragmatically modied. In the summer of , after serious defeats on the Western Front, strikes and mutinies, the fear of revolution and Bolshevism suddenly gripped the ruling elites of the Reich, including the military high command under Ludendorff himself, in the clearest and even hysterical way, there was of course an acute change of mood.
Full text of "A German-English dictionary for chemists"
But even in this period I cannot detect this triad of anti- Bolshevism, anti-Semitism and Russophobia at work. The strongest opponents of the Bolshevik-Spartakist upheavals in January and March were in fact the majority Social Democrats, who saw Bolshevism as a kind of Asian Socialism, or merely despotism.
Their fears about the possible total disintegration of the German state and society, which now lay open to the East, were so strong that they, together with parts of the catholic Zentrum party and the Liberal Democrats, were nally ready to subscribe the harsh peace conditions in Versailles. This led to a split with those active forces, who were organized in early as an anti-Bolshevist League and fought in the front line against the Spartakist uprisings.
The central gure was a Catholic activist named Eduard Stadtler, who had followed the revolutionary developments in Russia as a prisoner of war. He returned to Germany with the xed idea that in the event of a political-military collapse it was absolutely necessary to defend Germany against the wave of anarchist dissolution and moral depravation coming from the East, with the spectre of hungry, bare-footed, desperate soldiers Germans as well as Russians, Latvians, Hungarians and Jews guided by fanatical agitators.
He also thought that an effective defence would only be possible if the new German parties and authorities took up the spiritual and intellectual contents and motivations of Bolshevism in a positive way that of a German socialism which would be more organized, civilized and constructive.
It could be said that Stadtler without even knowing anything about Mussolini and his policies in held a corporatist view of a social dictatorship, and in this respect may be regarded as the gure of a German Mussolini manqu. This type of activist and positive anti-Bolshevism was never successful and in became part of the so-called young con- servativism, which was not then intended as an activist movement but as a strictly elitist grouping. It merged the Ideas of with those of the so-called Jugendbewegung youth movement.
The real spiritual leader was Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, who since had been the German editor for Dostoevskii together with the Russian religious philosopher Dmitrii Merezhkovskii and as such was in the forefront of the efforts to formulate the doctrines of an integral nationalism. Sentences like Every nation is battling for its own way of development, its place in the world, as a way to God, or Every nation has its own socialism were the teachings which Moeller allegedly took from Dostoevskii. Moeller transferred the vague spiritual inclinations to the East, which were predominant in the rst years of the Weimar Republic, into a perspective of a German political and military breakout, out of the system of Versailles and towards the young nations.
Then there was Oswald Spengler with his ideas of a Prussian socialism, which under the conditions of a new Russian pseudo-morphosis the Bolsheviks were in fact the heirs of the Petrinian reforms could lead to a new combination of Prussia and Russia as the focus of a new world civilization, an antagonist of the Declining West. Add to this picture the ideologues of the Jugendbewegung like Eugen Diederichs, who was the editor of the Collected Works of Tolstoi in Germany before and during the War, and developed his own ideas about the future fusion of the Germanic and Slavic peoples, whose characters he described in terms of male and female.
Or Carl Schmitt. Or Ernst Jnger. Were these young conservatives or, as they were also described, revolutionary conservatives, predecessors of the Nazis? Yes and no. Yes, because some of them were founding members of the Nazi movement or became active participants. But many others were ousted, like Otto Hoetzsch and his Osteuropa-Gesellschaft, which in the s and early s had done a lot of serious scientic research, often in partnership with Soviet institutions; or like Eduard Stadtler, the former anti-Bolshevist activist, who was now treated as a sectarian fascist.
The Nazis themselves drew a clear line between the so-called Ostorientierung eastern orientation of the s and their own Ostpolitik, which called for Lebensraum im Osten living space in the East and for a denite change of perspectives for German imperialism. And rightly so, since some of the revolutionary conservatives of the s were later to be found among the military conspirators of who attempted to assassinate Hitler, or even as members of the Red Chapel, the Soviet-orientated spy organization, e.
Arvid Harnack. There were also strong Russophile leanings and inclinations among the nationalist and anti-Semitic movements after Very often, the chief ideologues were Baltic emigrants who stood in close contact with the milieus of White-Russian emigrs. This was true for Alfred Rosenberg as one of the leading ideologues of the Nazi movement, as well as for Ludwig Mller von Hausen, who was the German editor of the infamous Protocols of the Elders of Zion. Jewish Bolshevism, especially in the gure of Trotskii, who was presented as the true ruler of Russia, appeared as a kind of foreign domination by Jewish revolutionaries who had mostly come from America, with the clear mission to extradite the country to the Western nancial capital.
So the main strategic idea in these circles, and also in the early Nazi party, was the common liberation of Russia and Germany, as the two most anti-Semitic nations, from Jewish domination, with the perspective of forming a continental bloc with strong, dictatorial, national regimes against the victors of the First World War, the powers of Versailles. The same perspective was also to be found, in an even more romantic and Russophile version, among the left, socialist wing of the Nazi movement, represented by the Strasser brothers, or Joseph Goebbels.
As a student of German literature the latter had grown up in an intellectual mood shaped completely by Nietzsche and Dostoevskii. His early novel Michael, written in the fashion of expressionism, is the story of a German and a Russian revolutionary. And as late as Goebbels spoke and wrote about the common battle of a seemingly more national-minded Soviet Russia with Nazi Germany, which were both seen primarily as a front of the young proletarian peoples of a mythically enlarged East against the old bourgeois countries of the West.
It was Hitler, who after his return from prison, reversed all these visions in his book Mein Kampf and proclaimed the change of the thousand-year-old migration of Germanic peoples to the south and west i. Germany should no longer try to conquer world markets or faraway colonies, but should acquire agrarian soil for the Reich and its human potential.
And here the fate itself shows us a huge empire to the East under Jewish domination, which is bound to fall apart, since all Aryan elites have been exterminated. This manifesto in Mein Kampf never became a political reality, not even in , since the precondition of this battle for living space was an alliance, or at least an arrangement, with Great Britain, and the idea of a breakdown of the Soviet Union, caused by Jewish domination under Stalins rule, had become thoroughly un- convincing.
Hitler had undone the tie of the former conservative or nationalist eastern orientations in Germany, which could never be spelled through in terms of real politics. The question remains: what has been the real impact of these different, half leftist, half conservative eastern orientations in Germany before and after the First World War, and the Russian Revolution? In the elds of ne arts, literature, music, lm or architecture, they were part of the astonishing fertility and diversity of the German culture in the precarious times of the Weimar Republic.
And as Karl Schlgel and others have shown, there was still a strong element of personal relationship, be it in the sense of an old, renewed familiarity or of a fertile new differentiation. Berlin was in particular the meeting point of all the migrations and inuences, the collisions and collusions between Germany and the new Russia. This was in a way a last salute to a whole era of rather dense cultural relations, a desperate attempt to ignore or to overcome the cultural and political drift or split which began to run through the Continent.
But the virtual possibility of an eastern orientation enamed the fantasies and was, in sober retrospective judgement, an element of the non-capacity and non-preparedness of the new Weimar Republic to arrange with the changed world situation, which was not so unfavourable and even potentially promising. Germany could not decide between the factual socio-economical and cultural integration to the West, and the seemingly deeper and more promising prospects of an Eastern orientation.
So this became part of the revisionist complex of the Weimar years, a moment of German irredentism of the time, or as the Hungarian social philosopher Istvan Bib put it, of German hysteria. There is a valid reason why there is hardly a visible trace of the hundred thousand refugees from the former Russian Empire who ed to Germany during the years between the wars, as Berlin became the capital city beyond the borders of Russia.
Nowhere was the situation of the Russian Diaspora so paradoxical, nowhere was the dilemma of Russian emigrants shown as dramatically as it was in Germany, where they sought asylum. The Russian emigrants came into what had been the enemy country between and ; with the help of the Germans, Russian revolutionaries were conveyed in a sealed train to Petrograd; with the peace of Brest-Litovsk on 3 March , Germany forced Soviet Russia into signing a humiliating peace treaty. The Russian refugees came into a country that had surprised the world on l6 April by opening formal diplomatic relations with Russia in the Treaty of Rapallo, thereby pulling the rug from under every claim of emigration based on the representation of Russian interests.
They came into a country that from to was devastated by crises, civil war- like conditions and separatist movements that differed little from those from which the Russian refugees had just escaped. They were migrs in a country that in itself became the source of a great refugee movement, that started the Second World War in , and in launched its attack on the Soviet Union, in which Russians were liable to be eliminated as sub-humans.
There was no point during the Russian Diaspora of the inter-war years when it was not abundantly clear that emigration did not mean salvation, but just one of the various forms of existence in the European Thirty Years War; at no point in time during the Russian Diaspora was.
The splendour and misery of Russian emigration in Germany in those years is characterized by this constellation. There is hardly anything left of the once strong Russian com- munity of the inter-war period following the rule of the National Socialists, the Second World War and the subsequent partition of Germany. There are generally few personal connections and little continuity in life histories between the earlier migrs and the second wave of those who did not return home, which took place in the s.
This is even truer of those Soviet migrs of the third wave of the s and s. Today there is a steadily decreasing number of witness to those times. We should be all the more grateful, therefore, for the few works available that do deal with emigration. As might be expected, there is a difference between the work of East and West German historians. Even though important source materials on the white emigrants lay in East German archives, historians concentrated almost exclusively on German- Soviet cultural relationships, and treated the role of the emigrants only as an aside.
Thus collections are accessible to us today that were handed over by migr organizations to the Historical Foreign Archive in Prague and then taken in to the Soviet Union, where they are for the most part stored in the State Archive of the October Revolution. These records offer insight into life within the Russian migr organizations, such as those of Ukrainians, Georgians, Azerbaijanis, Jews, Turks, White Russians and others, as well as into their politics in the s, the s and during the Second World War. Exact stat- istics are hard to obtain for several reasons: rstly, not all refugees registered themselves; secondly, ofcial data from various organiza- tions and authorities are incomplete; and thirdly, the classication of the refugees is frequently problematic.
At the end of there were approximately 1. These captives were supposed to return home after negotiations with the German-Soviet repatriation commission, yet they were free to stay in Germany if they so wished. The camps were seen by the differ- ent sides as a recruiting base: the Soviet Government hoped to increase the ranks of the Red Army through repatriation, just as the White Russians hoped to add the POWs to Vrangels army in southern Russia, and that of Iudenich and Avalov-Bermondt in the eastern Baltic.
The German government was interested in quick repatriation, fearing dangerous sources of domestic political unrest in the prison camps, while the representatives of the Entente for a time blocked the process in the hope of strengthening the White Armies. Some Russian prisoners of war indeed found their way back to the front lines in the Russian civil war either on the side of the Red Army and the German communists, or on the side of the White Russians and the Germans Freikorps.
And, as long as the Russian war was undecided, Berlin was an outpost of that conict. Soviet Russia, were completed in July Some 15, to 20, Russian soldiers, who did not want to return home or had escaped the attention of the authorities, stayed behind in Germany. Another wave of asylum seekers reached Germany after the defeat of Vrangels army in November , then in spring , with another wave arriving via France throughout The refugees in Germany were citizens of the former Russian Empire that had now been broken up into many different sovereign states, such as Finland, the Ukraine, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania and the Caucasian repub- lics.
Inasmuch as these people had not become citizens of the newly-formed countries, they possessed only the citizenship of a non-existent state. The overwhelming majority of the emigrants thought of themselves merely as temporary refugees until the downfall of the Bolsheviks from Russia. Scarcely anyone thought that this provisional situation would acquire permanent status. They saw themselves accordingly not as emigrants, but rather as bezhentsy, i. For years they remained unwilling emigrants. All estimates have to be seen against this background.
For all the imprecision of the total estimate, the course of Russian immigration and emigration is quite clear. According to the calculations of the Russian Delegation for Prisoners-of-War and Returning Migrants in Germany there were around , refugees in In the American Red Cross in Germany declared the number of Russians it supported to be , The inux of Russian refugees reached its high point between and According to gures provided by the League of Nations and the German Foreign Ofce there were approximately , Russian refugees in Germany in these two years, of whom some , had sought asylum in Berlin alone in Russians in Germany, which by had decreased to , The estimate of , Russians in Berlin in possibly reects the self-interest of the Russian Trust in Berlin in boosting its importance with inated numbers, yet it may be taken as a fact that a considerable Russian community existed in Germany even after This is now known as behavioural imprinting in order to distinguish it from the carelessly labeled but nonetheless fascinating phenomenon of "genomic imprinting".
Usually the object of the attachment is a member of its own species. However, the nature of the rapid learning process is such that, if the young animal is reared under abnormal conditions, imprinting can result in the formation of bizarre attachments. Ducklings or domestic chicks that have been hand-reared for the first few days after hatching strongly prefer the company of their human "parent" to that of their own species. Early experience can also have long-lasting effects on sexual preferences, but the conditions are different from those in which the first filial attachments are formed.
Konrad Lorenz , who did so much to make the phenomenon famous, liked the image because it suggests, as he believed to be the case, an instantaneous, irreversible process. It also led to strong claims that imprinting is quite different from associative learning e. Hess As more evidence became available, the claims were disputed Bateson ; Sluckin , Bolhuis The special flavour of the phenomenon, it was argued, comes from the particular biological job which the learning process has to perform and the context in which it occurs. The biological function of imprinting is probably to enable the animal to recognise close kin.
In the natural environment behavioural imprinting reliably results in the formation of a strong social bond between offspring and parent. The parent must recognise the offspring in order not waste time and energy caring for the young of others. The offspring must recognise its parent because it might be attacked and even killed by other adults of the same species that do not recognise it as their own.
Filial imprinting ensures that a young animal can distinguish between its parent and other members of its own species. Sexual imprinting enables an animal to mate with an individual that is neither too closely nor too distantly related Bateson Astonishing retention of sexual preferences is found in the face of considerable sexual experience with other objects in zebra finches fostered onto another species Immelmann However, not all birds and mammals are so markedly affected by their early experience.
Moreover, sexual preferences may be determined at a much later stage in development than filial preferences. In order to demonstrate that imprinting takes place, one group of animals is exposed to an object A for a finite period of time and then given a choice between that object and another one B. Since the animals might have preferred Object A over Object B without prior experience, it is necessary to expose a second group of animals to Object B before being given the choice test.
If both groups prefer the object to which they have been exposed in the choice tests, then it is safe to assume that the difference in the preferences of the two groups is due to the period of exposure. The choice tests may be conducted so that the animals see both objects at the same time.
Alternatively, the animals may be exposed first to Object A on its own, then to Object B ; then, to control for any order effects, they are tested successively in the reverse order. If an animal has no preference its score will be 0. If it has strong preference for Object A , the score will be close to 1. When precocial birds such as domestic chicks are used they are commonly tested in running wheels and the rotations of the wheels are scored as they attempt to approach each test object.
The experimental operations by which imprinting is demonstrated differ in significant ways from classical conditioning and from learning in an instrumental situation involving the formation of associations between separately occurring neutral and significant external events. When an animal learns to use one event to predict the arrival of another, that is not the same as when it forms a new representation of something in the outside world. Learning to predict and control the environment subserves a different function from learning to categorise it.
Moreover, the mechanisms differ. In uncovering causality , detecting order is crucial. If the supposed cause follows an event, then it is not a cause. By contrast, when establishing a category, temporal contiguity may be important, but the order in which the features occur is not Bateson A bird that has to recognize its mother must gather information about her front, side and back views of its mother. Information from two separate arrays of features may be combined into a single representation when the two arrays occur in the same context or within a short time of each other.
If imprinting objects are presented five or more minutes apart, the birds learns to discriminate between the two objects more quickly than those in the control group which had not been exposed to these two objects. However, when the two objects are presented 30 seconds or less apart, the imprinted birds takes longer than the control group to learn the discrimination. When they are treated as part of the same event, the order of presentation does not matter in the least.
Imprinting differs both in its function and mechanism from widely studied processes of conditioning.